Marriage Premium and Class by Bonilla R et al.
Marriage Premium and Class 
Roberto Bonilla
Newcastle University, UK
Francis Z. Kiraly
Newcastle University, UK
John Wildman
Newcastle University, UK
11 June 2017
Abstract
We present an equilibrium model with inter-linked labour and mar-
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1 Introduction
Why do married men generally earn more than unmarried men? The question
has intrigued the economics profession for a long time, as the so-called male
marriage premium has consistently been found to be anywhere between 10%
and 40% or even as high as 50%. In sharp contrast, the female marital
earnings gap is negative and much smaller in magnitude.
The current literature o¤ers two broad explanations which di¤er in terms
of the direction of causality they favour. According to the specialisation
theory developed by Becker (1973, 1974, 1985, 1991) and Mincer and Po-
lachek (1974), marriage allows for economies of scale and intra-household
specialisation of labour, with men being able to focus on formal employment,
which in turn tends to enhance productivity and earnings. In a similar vein,
Grossbard-Shechtman and Neuman (2003) note that the spouse also increases
a married mans productivity directly by enhancing his human capital and
general well-being.
In turn, proponents of the selection hypothesis such as Nakosteen and
Zimmer (1987), Davies and Peronaci (1997) and Gray (1997) argue that men
who are more productive at work and /or earn high wages are more likely
to get married. This may be the case if some traits that make men more
productive in the labour market (such as loyalty, honesty and dependability)
are also valued in the marriage market. Interestingly, this selection e¤ect
could also work indirectly through labour market gender discrimination, with
employers favouring married men because they too associate marriage with
productivity-enhancing traits.
Two important questions arise. First, why is there no female marriage
premium? After all, there is no obvious reason why the above logic should not
hold symmetrically for both sexes. Needless to say, women are just as likely to
have unobservable characteristics that are valued both in employment and
marriage, so why is the selection argument presumed one-sided? In turn,
unless there are explicit gender di¤erences which stem from comparative
advantages in human capital accumulation, labour market discrimination
or intra-household bargaining positions, the specialisation argument is also
biased.
Of course, with the marked qualitative di¤erence between observed male
and female marriage premia, this unequal treatment is a reasonable ad hoc as-
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sumption. In our opinion, however, it obscures the key fact that whatever the
source of such asymmetry, it all boils down to men apparently being regarded
as providers in a household. Whether this is the case simply because of atti-
tudes towards marriage or it derives from family membersdi¤ering options
in the labour market, it is this (possibly self-fullling) belief that ultimately
underpins the behaviour of marriage partners under both approaches. We
argue that such expectations within a household should be made explicit, as
they a¤ect the entire job nding process and hence the wages earned by men.
Second, it is apparent that existing explanations of male marriage wage
di¤erentials follow the standard neoclassical approach which tends to equate
human capital with earnings. But if one takes the job nding process seri-
ously and considers search behaviour in frictional labour markets, produc-
tivity and wages can no longer be assumed inter-changeable. In turn, this
means that the link between male productivity and marriage as assumed by
the specialisation and selectivity theories may not be quite so straightforward
either.
What is needed therefore is an equilibrium analysis, with male wage dif-
ferentials as possible outcomes in a framework where labour market decisions
are inuenced by expectations and behaviour in the marriage market, and
vice-versa. Naturally, this framework should also include search frictions, as
it takes time, e¤ort and luck to nd a job and a suitable marital partner.
To achive this, we construct a model where the two frictional markets are
inter-linked. In the marriage market, men and women engage in two-sided se-
quential search for partners. Women prefer high earners (breadwinners) and
this is common knowledge. In our setup, these marriage market expectations
are neatly captured by womens reservation match value.
In turn, unemployed men engage in job search, knowing that their earn-
ings determine whether or not they can get married. Formalising this sequen-
tial decision problem is, however, far from trivial, as one needs to capture
the possibility of a man encountering wages that make him marriageable or
not. To that end, we introduce and analyse the so-called constrained search
problem facing an unemployed male. This variant of the standard sequential
job search constitutes the bridge between the two markets in the sense that
the optimal strategy (reservation wage) is now a function of marriage market
expectations.
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In a preliminary study, Bonilla and Kiraly (2013) show that a male mar-
riage premium can indeed be an equilibrium outcome in a setup where men
are homogeneous in terms of productivity. Here, we expand that simple
model in two important ways. In order to gain a better understanding of the
role of search frictions and productivity di¤erences in generating patterns
of marital wage premia, we rst allow for male heterogeneity in the labour
market. Following that, we augment the model by also including female
heterogeneity, with women having di¤erent levels of attractiveness in the
marriage market. The setup with two-sided heterogeneity provides a natural
framework to examine the question of who marries whom.
We make several contributions in this paper. First, with one-sided het-
erogeneity, we conrm that a positive male marriage premium can obtain in
equilibrium. The key insight is that with job search, the optimal stopping
strategy determines both the probability of getting married and the average
wages earned by various groups of men.
We show that with random sequential constrained job search, the optimal
reservation wage may in fact be set so low that it precludes marriage. The
logic is quite intuitive: although marriage leads to an increase in utility for
a man, the opportunity cost of holding out for a wage acceptable to women
may outweigh this utility gain if the required well-paid jobs are relatively
di¢ cult to encounter. As a result, there will be single men on relatively low
wages and men who can marry because they have good jobs.
Second, we establish that ex-ante productivity heterogeneity is neither a
necessary nor a su¢ cient condition for the existence of male marriage pre-
mium. That is, such wage di¤erentials can exist within each male productiv-
ity group, while the pattern of rankable marriage premia across productivity
types does not exclude the possibility of same (zero) marital earnings gaps
for di¤erent types of men.
Third, we examine the endogenous formation of marital classes where the
sorting occurs along male wages and female levels of attractiveness. Crucially
however, the distribution of wages earned by males is now itself determined
endogenously, through the optimal reservation wage strategies of di¤erent
men. This is in contrast with the setup used in the seminal Burdett and
Coles (1997) paper and virtually all subsequent work on assortative matching
in the presence of search frictions, which assume an exogenous distribution of
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wages.1 To that end, we construct an equilibrium with two classes, establish
the existence of a bottom class and characterise marital partnerships in terms
of male marriage premia.
Fourth, we carry out the rst empirical investigation of the role of search
frictions in explaining the male marital earnings gap.2 Our ndings strongly
indicate that marriage premia follow indeed the patterns across male pro-
ductivity types suggested by our model. Furthermore, in our sample we nd
evidence of assortative matching and a bottom marital class, where men with
very low socio-economic characteristics exhibit a zero marriage premium and
are in partnerships with similarly "below average" women.
The existing literature on male marriage premium, excellently surveyed
by Grossbard-Shechtman and Neuman (2003), Daniel (1995) and Hersch
(2003), is almost exclusively empirical in nature. In the main, the stud-
ies use either cross sectional data or models with panel data, as well as
some econometric models based on marriage market analysis. The standard
methodology is to allow for individual-specic xed e¤ects in order to elim-
inate unobserved heterogeneity. Korenman and Neumark (1991), Cornwell
and Rupert (1995) and Schoeni (1995) are good examples of this approach.
Although much of the empirical work appears to conrm the existence
of a link between productivity di¤erences and male marriage wage premium,
the evidence in support of either the selection or specialisation explanations
is exasperatingly mixed.
The results of Chun and Lee (2001) suggest that the selection e¤ect is
minimal, while Ginther and Zavodny (2001) nd that only up to 10% of
wage premium is the result of selection. In contrast, Loh (1996) and Hersch
and Stratton (2000) argue that the e¤ect of a potential productivity increase
after marriage is also quite weak. Blackburn and Korenman (1994) consider
evidence for both theories but conclude that neither seem to be su¢ cient ex-
planations for the existence of marriage premium. More recently, Antonovics
1The only other paper we are aware of that looks at endogenous marriage partner traits
is Chiappori et al. (2009), which includes an ex-ante choice of investment in education.
2The need for such an empirical appraisal of the role of frictions in explaining male
marriage premium is stressed in Ponthieux and Meurs (2014). Incidentally, Bonilla et
al.(2015) also provide evidence of the link between market frictions and marriage premium,
but their focus is on testing the search theoretical approach to beauty premium.
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and Town (2004) use an US sample that includes twins, and reach the con-
clusion that the observed male marital premium cannot be explained by the
selection hypothesis. In contrast, Bardasi and Taylor (2008) use UK panel
data and remark that although household specialisation is a relevant con-
tributing factor, the earnings gap is more likely to be the result of a selection
e¤ect.
It is apparent therefore that the evidence gathered so far is not in a po-
sition to settle the question, and the controversy goes on. Perhaps a new
approach is needed. In an illuminating paragraph which we quote in full,
Grossbard-Shechtman and Neuman (2003) highlight the problems facing em-
pirical research on marriage premium and stress the need for a fresh angle:
"What such xed-e¤ects models tell us is what part of the marital di¤erentials
are due to selectivity into marriage and what part are productivity-enhancing
e¤ects of marriage. However, the selectivity e¤ect could be a breadwinner
e¤ect: It could be that an unmeasured motivation to marry had led men
to enhance their labor market productivity and earnings, knowing that this
would increase their chances of getting married. So identifying a sequence
running from productivity to marriage does not prove that it is not mar-
riage that makes men more productive. If selectivity e¤ects are breadwinner
e¤ects, it is the prospect of marriage that makes men more productive."
In this context, we hope that the market equilibrium approach we pro-
pose, which incorporates search frictions as well as the breadwinner hypoth-
esis will prove to be a fruitful contribution to the debate about the sources
of male marriage premium.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we describe the model
with male heterogeneity. Section 3 establishes the existence of a search equi-
librium with marriage premium and examines the e¤ect of male productivity
di¤erences. Section 4 considers the augmented framework with two-sided het-
erogeneity. There, we construct a search equilibrium with two marital classes
characterised by specic marriage premium patterns. Next, an empirical sec-
tion provides evidence in support of our theory. Concluding remarks appear
in Section 6.
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2 The model
The economy consists of a continuum of women and men, all risk neutral.
Time is continuous and all agents discount the future at rate r. Only steady
state equilibria are considered.
Men enter the economy unemployed and single. We rst consider the
scenario with two types of men who di¤er in terms of productivity. The
subscript i (where i = L;H) denotes low- and high productivity type, re-
spectively. Let ui denote the steady state measure of single unemployed men
of type i.
In the labour market, unemployed men use costless random sequential job
search, and contact with a rm occurs at rate 0, identical for the two types.
A type i unemployed draws an o¤er from the exogenous wage distribution
Fi(w) with support [wi; wi], and we assume that wL < wH , wL < wH and
FL(w) > FH(w). A single man who is employed at wage w has ow payo¤
w. There is no on-the-job search and no job destruction, so a mans wage
remains constant throughout his working life.
All single men look for potential female marital partners. Women can
observe a mans employment status, his productivity and earned wage. In the
marriage market, meetings occur according to a quadratic matching function,
where the number of meetings is proportional to the product of the measure
of searchers on each side of the market. This (see Mortensen, 1982) gives rise
to a Poisson meeting technology with an arrival rate that is a linear function
of the relevant measure of participants on the opposite side of the market.
For men of type i, we denote this arrival rate by im. A married man earning
wage w enjoys ow payo¤w+y, where y > 0 captures the utility of marriage.
Assume that y is the same for both types of men, and there is no possibility
of divorce.
Let n denote the measure of single women, and let x denote the exogenous
ow payo¤ of a single woman. Women do not look for jobs3, but use costless
random sequential search to locate single males. Let iw and 
u
w be the
parameters of the Poisson process and hence the rate at which a woman
meets a type i employed man or an unemployed, respectively. Upon contact,
a woman decides whether to accept or reject a marriage proposal. Let Ni
3If they did, x could of course be endogenous, just as it would under any other scenario
where women are active in the labour market.
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denote the measure of employed single men of type i who are acceptable
to women. A married womans ow payo¤ is equal to her partners wage
earnings. Upon marriage a woman gives up x, so we assume that x < wL
in order to ensure that a marital partnership with either type of man does
indeed have a positive potential surplus.4
Marriages are for life, but couples and singles alike leave the economy at
an exogenous rate . Every time an unemployed single man of type i accepts
a job, gets married or leaves the economy, he is replaced by another type i
unemployed single man. Hence, ui can be treated as exogenous. Similarly,
we assume that a new single woman enters the economy every time a single
woman gets married or exits, so n can also be regarded as exogenous.
Denote by  the parameter which measures the e¢ ciency of the meeting
process. Let Ni denote the measure of employed marriageable single men of
type i. Then, from a single mans point of view, the average instantaneous
rate at which meetings occur is im =
(NH+NL)n
(NH+NL)
= n. Similarly, from the
point of view of single women, the rate at which meetings with unemployed
men occur is uw =
(uH+uL)n
n
, while the corresponding rate of meeting em-
ployed men of type i is iw =
(NH+NL)n
n
Ni
(NH+NL)
= Ni. The steady state
measure Ni is of course endogenous, and consequently so is 
i
w, together
with the steady state measures of unmarriageable men of type i (bachelors,
denoted by Bi) and of married men of type i (denoted by Mi).
Before we proceed with the analysis, we dene the marriage premium
among type i men (MPi) as the di¤erence between the average wage of
type i married men (ewMi ) and the average wage of type i single men (ewSi ).
Throughout, superscripts S andM stand for "single" and "married", respec-
tively. Finally, in the context of the paper, "marriageable" and "eligible" are
used interchangeably.
4Blundell et al. (2015) show that female attachment to the labour market weakens
considerably after marriage. This has an immediate impact on their earnings (due to non-
participation) , but also a lasting impact in the form lower future wages and part time
work even after reattachment to the labour market. In turn, Gould and Passerman (2013),
Openheimer (1988), Oppenheimer and Lew (1995), Loughran (2002) and Loughran and
Zissimopoulos (2009) provide evidence that women build this into their expectations and
behaviour in the marriage market.
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3 Marriage Premium
Given sequential search and the fact that utilities are increasing in wages,
we show that women and men alike use optimal strategies characterised by
the reservation property. However, crucially, mens best response is in fact a
reservation wage function Ri(Ti), where Ti is the reservation match of women.
3.1 Women
In this section, we rst establish that women refuse to marry unemployed
men of type i if the reservation match of females is high enough. To see that,
consider a married and employed man of type i. Without the possibility
of either on-the-job search or divorce, and conditional on survival, standard
considerations give the discounted expected lifetime utility:
V Mi (w) =
w + y
r + 
:
Although the above utility is clearly independent of productivity type, in
the interest of clarity we will continue to use these subscripts when referring
to this employment value.
Now consider a married but unemployed man of type i. If such a man
receives a wage o¤er w and behaves optimally in each period, the relevant
Bellman equation is:
vMi (w) = max

V Mi (w); J
M
i
	
In the above, JMi denotes a jobless married mans value from continued
job search, and it is given by:
JMi =
1
r +  + 0
"
y + 0
Z wi
wi
vMi (w)dFi(w)
#
:
Above, the right-hand side captures the expected discounted return. Re-
call that y is the instantaneous utility from a marital partnership, while the
second term in the brackets describes the expected utility of any change in
the value of this mans state, computed as the probability he receives a job
o¤er (0) times the expected continuation value associated with the wage
o¤er w, given that the o¤er can of course be rejected.
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Note that JMi is independent of any current wage o¤er. In turn, V
M
i (w)
is continuous and increasing in the accepted o¤er w, so the optimal strategy
has the reservation property. Denote the relevant reservation wage by RMi ,
and manipulate the above equation to obtain the familiar version:
(r + )JMi = y + 0
Z wi
RMi

V Mi   JMi

dFi (w) :
Given the above, the married mans reservation wage RMi solves the stan-
dard equation:
JMi = V
M
i (R
M
i ) =
RMi + y
r + 
;
and we get:
RMi =
0
r + 
Z wi
RMi
[w  RMi ]dFi(w):
Further integration by parts leads to:
RMi =
0
r + 
Z wi
RMi
[1  Fi(w)] dw  Ri (1)
Importantly, RH > RL, because the two types of men face di¤erent
prospects in the labour market.
Furthermore, Ri is also the reservation wage of type i unemployed men
in a standard sequential job search problem where there is no link with the
marriage market. As we will show later, Ri is in fact the lowest reservation
wage for each type.
In principle, women could of course marry unemployed men too. Let
us therefore examine the situation of a woman who is married to a jobless
type i man. Introducing the subscript Ui to denote marriage to such an
unemployed, her value function WMUi is given by:
(r + )WMUi = 0
Z wi
Ri

WMi (w) WMUi

dFi(w);
where WMi (w) =
w
r+
is the discounted lifetime utility of being married
to a type i employed man who earns wage w. The interpretation is straight-
forward: the ow value of being married to a type i unemployed man is
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essentially the potential benet from any increase in her utility if the man
nds and takes up a job o¤er w.
For Ti to be a female reservation match, it needs to satisfy WMUi =
Ti
r+
.
Making use of WMi (w) above leads to:
(r + )WMUi =
0
r + 
Z wi
Ri
[w   Ti] dFi(w):
Since the right-hand side is equal to Ri for Ti = Ri, we have:
(r + )WMUi = Ti = Ri
On the other hand, for Ri < Ti we instead have:
(r + )WMUi > Ri
Therefore, women reject marriage to a type i unemployed man if Ti > Ri
For the rest of Section 3, we work under the assumption that this is indeed
the case.5
Next, we derive the womens reservation match (wage) Ti.
First, note that when a woman turns down an employed man, she returns
to the same pool of potential partners. From her point of view, the expected
value of continued search is therefore independent of the wage she rejected,
and reects the mix of high- and low productivity men.
Second, as there is no job destruction and a married womans instant
utility is not a¤ected directly by her partners productivity, the lifetime utility
of accepting a man with a wage w is simply the discounted value of that wage:
w
r+
, which is clearly continuous and increasing in w.
Overall, this means that with sequential search, the optimal stopping
strategy has the familiar reservation property: a woman will accept a type i
man as long as his wage is at least as high as Ti.
From the point of view of a single woman, the key considerations are:
the number of single marriageable employed men of each type (Ni), and
5By doing so, we eliminate the uninteresting (for the purpose of this section) equilib-
rium where the marriage market does not a¤ect job search. However, we do allow for this
in Section 4.
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the wages earned by these eligible single men, captured by the distribution
function Gi(:). Therefore, in order to compute a single womans utility, it is
helpful to determine (Ni) and Gi(:) rst.
Eligible men of type i get married at rate n and die at rate , while
unemployed men of type i nd marriageable wages at rate 0 [1  Fi(Ti)].
Therefore, the steady-state equation for Ni is:
Ni(n+ ) = ui0 [1  Fi(Ti)] ;
which gives
Ni =
ui0 [1  Fi(Ti)]
n+ 
(2)
In turn, Gi(:) is obtained from Ni above, together with the inow-outow
equation:
ui0 [Fi(w)  Fi(Ti)] = ( + n)NiGi(w)
From here, we get:
Gi(w) =
Fi(w)  Fi(Ti)
1  Fi(Ti) : (3)
Before we turn to the female reservation match, let us complete the pic-
ture by nding the steady state measures of bachelors (Bi) and married men
(Mi), together with their respective wage distributions. Bachelors are men
who have accepted jobs that make them un-marriageable, so their inow-
outow equation is:
ui0 [F (Ti)  F (Ri)] = Bi (4)
Let Ei(w) denote the distribution of wages amongst these men. We have:
ui0 [F (w)  F (Ri)] = BiEi(w);
and therefore:
Ei(w) =
F (w)  F (Ri)
F (Ti)  F (Ri) : (5)
In turn, the steady state condition for the measure of married men is
simply:
nNi = Mi (6)
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Finally, as the rate at which marriageable men get married and the rate at
which married men exit the economy are both independent of their wages,
the distribution of wages earned by type i married men is also Gi(w).
We now turn to the reservation match set by women. Recall that the
rate at which a woman meets an eligible single employed man of type i is
wi = Ni. Denote the expected value of being single for a woman byW
S(w).
Then, provided Ti > Ri for both male types, we have:
(r + )W S(w) = x+ NH
Z wH
TH

w
r + 
 W S

dGH(w) +
+NL
Z wL
TL

w
r + 
 W S

dGL(w):
Making use of (2) and (3), one obtains the alternative expression:
(r + )W S(w) = x+
uH0
n+ 
wHZ
TH

w
r + 
 W S

dFH(w) + (7)
+
uL0
n+ 
wLZ
TL

w
r + 
 W S

dFL(w)
The left-hand side is the ow value for a single woman. On the right-hand
side, we have the instantaneous utility x plus the expected increase in utility
that results from any change in the value of her state, which is computed as
the probability she meets an eligibe type i employed man times the expected
increase in value. Since W S(w) = Ti=(r+ ), we have TH = TL, so from now
on we denote the women reservation wage (match) as simply T .
Please observe that W S, and therefore T itself are both independent of
mens search strategy Ri. This is because the two distributions of posted
wages are exogenous: type i mens reservation wage strategy does not a¤ect
Fi(:), and nor does it a¤ect the rate at which job searchers nd wages that
ensure the prospect of marriage. Finally, as one can see from (3), the measure
of eligible men (Ni) is also independent of Ri.
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3.2 Men
Unemployed single men face a decision problem that we term constrained
job search. These men sample wage o¤ers knowing that they can only get
married if they land a wage at least as high as womens reservation match.
With sequential search, a type i unemployed single man uses an optimal
stopping strategy that essentially boils down to having a reservation wage
function Ri(T ). The shape of this best reply function is crucial for our
analysis, and we show it has pretty robust characteristics.
As mentioned before, the more interesting and empirically relevant range
is T 2 (Ri; wi], where unemployed men are turned down by women. In
contrast, employed single men could in principle be on wages that ensure
marriageability.
Consider an unemployed single man of type i who has just obtained an of-
fer w. This wage makes him either marriageable or not marriageable. Denote
by V Si (w) the value of accepting such a job. Then, standard considerations
mean that:
V Si (w) =
 w
r + 
+ n
(r +  + n)(r + )
y if w  T
w
r + 
if w < T

(8)
Clearly, the value of accepting an o¤er w is a piecewise linear function:
it is increasing in wage w and is discontinuous at w = T .
Let vi(w) be the expected value for a type i unemployed man who cur-
rently has an o¤er w that confers marriageability, and let vi(w) denote the
value of currently holding a wage o¤er that precludes marriage. This man
has to decide whether to accept or reject such a job o¤er. Let Ji denote the
value that a type i unemployed man attaches to the option of continued job
search, and note that for any currently held wage o¤er w, this value Ji is in
fact independent of w.
Then, the corresponding two Bellman equations are:
vi(w) = max

V Si (w j w  T ); Ji
	
and
vi(w) = max

V Si (w j w < T ); Ji
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Note that for y > 0, we have V Si (w j w  T ) > V Si (w j w < T ), and
therefore vi  vi. The latter is with strict inequality if V Si (w j w  T ) > Ji,
which in turn is true for T > Ri (see the proof of Proposition 1 below).
Independently of a current wage o¤er w, and of course provided there is
contact with another rm, continued job search leads to a new wage o¤er w0.
Given Fi(:), the probability with which any such w0 is higher (or lower) than
the female reservation wage (match) T depends only on T itself.
Importantly, all the above means that Ji is a convex combination of vi(w)
and vi(w):
Ji =
0
r +  + 0
"Z wi
T
vi(w
0)dFi(w0) +
Z T
wi
vi(w
0)dFi(w0)
#
: (9)
A given wage o¤er either confers marriageability or precludes the prospect
of marriage. The right-hand side captures the discounted expected return
to search: the terms in the big brackets describe the expected utility of
any change in the value of a type i unemployed mans state. Here, this is
computed as the probability that he receives a wage o¤er (0), times the
expected continuation value associated with the o¤er w0, bearing in mind
not only that an o¤er can of course be accepted or rejected, but also that
if accepted, this wage then either guarantees or jeopardises completely ones
marriage prospects.
The above continuation value Ji is continuous for any T < wi, and is
decreasing in T for vi > vi. In contrast, Ji is independent of T for T  wi,
since for such Ts Fi(T ) = 1. With this in mind, let bTi be the T for which
Ji(T ) =
w
r+
at w = T . This particular female reservation match will prove
extremely useful throughout our analysis below.
Making use of all the above, we are ready to fully characterise the male
reservation wage function for any T .
Proposition 1 (A) For T 2 (Ri; wi], the optimal strategy has the reserva-
tion property. The reservation wage function Ri(T ) solves
Ri(T ) = min

w : V Si (w)  Ji
	
;
it is continuous and piecewise di¤erentiable, with:
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(i) Ri = T for T 2 (Ri; bTi];
(ii) Ri < T and decreasing in T for T 2 (bTi; wi);
(B) For T  Ri and T  wi the optimal strategy has the reservation
property, and the reservation wage is Ri.
Proof. Part (A). To address (i), recall that bTi is the T for which Ji(T ) = wr+
at w = T . If T = bTi, the optimal policy is a reservation wage Ri and Ri = T
as V Si (w j w < T ) < Ji for w < bTi and V Si (w j w  T ) > Ji for w  bTi. As T
decreases, Ji(T ) increases and Tr+ decreases. For a small decrease in T , we
have Ji > V Si (w j w < T ) and Ji < V Si (w j w  T ), so the reservation wage
equals T . Let eTi denote the T so low that Ji(eTi) = V Si (w j w = eTi). It is easy
to show that eTi < Ri, and therefore V Si (w j w  T ) > Ji for T 2 [Ri; bTi]. It
follows that Ri = T for T 2 (Ri; bTi].
To address (ii), start at T = bTi, where Tr+ = Ji(T ), and consider an in-
crease in T . Then, T
r+
increases and Ji(T ) decreases. Since the discontinuity
in V Si (w) moves rightward, it follows that Ji = V
S
i (w j w < T ) holds for a
wage lower than T . This is our reservation wage Ri, which clearly decreases
as T increases. The derivation of both Ri and bTi are relegated to Appendix
A, where we also show that given a nite y and nite job o¤er arrival rate,
the Ri < T range always exists. One can also conclude that the optimal
reservation wage is continuous in T , with a corner at bTi. Finally, for T = wi,
we have Fi(T ) = 1 and the problem reverts to one of standard sequential job
search.
Part (B). From (1), we know that once married, a type i unemployed
man drops his reservation wage to Ri. Despite that, if T  Ri a woman
would still be willing to marry such a man. Recall that JMi =
Ri+y
r+
and let
J
0
i denote the value of a single unemployed man in this scenario. For any
optimally chosen reservation wage R0i that is higher than (or equal to) T we
have V Si (w j w  T ) for any acceptable o¤er, and V Si (w j w  T ) continuous
in w. One can therefore write J
0
i using the standard asset pricing equation:
(r + ) J 0i = n

JMi   J 0i

+0
Z wi
R0i

w
r + 
+
n
(r + )(r +  + n)
y   J 0i

dFi(w);
with the reservation wage R
0
i solving V
S
i (R
0
i) = J
0
i . It is easy to show that Ri
is indeed higher than T and satises V Si (Ri) = J
0
i , so R
0
i = Ri.
Finally, for T  wi, we have Fi(T ) = 1 and the problem reverts to one of
standard sequential job search.
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The reservation wage functions of unemployed men are illustrated in
Figure 1. The diagram shows that mens best response functions are non-
monotonic and attain their respective maximum values at T = bTi, with bRi
= Ri(bTi) = bTi. Since FH(w) < FL(w), we have that RL < RH and bTH > bTL.
Clearly, bRi > Ri.
This non-monotonicity captures an interesting trade-o¤ faced by all men,
for di¤erent levels of T . When the marriage problem is non-trivial, an in-
crease in the male reservation wage has two e¤ects. On the one hand, it
guarantees marriageability - if it satises womens reservation match. On
the other hand, any increase in reservation wage comes at the cost of nar-
rowing ones job prospects.
If the female reservation match is relatively low (but still above Ri), the
opportunity cost is not too high, and therefore men hold out for such a wage.
However, this opportunity cost increases with T and there is a threshold value
(bTi) for which the negative e¤ect is no longer compensated by the prospect
of marriage.
For T 2 (bTi; wi), we can show (see Appendix A) that the reservation wage
solves:
Ri =
0
r + 
Z wi
Ri
[1  Fi(w)] dw + [1  Fi(T )]n
r +  + n
y

(< T )
By setting a reservation wage lower than what women expect, a single
man risks throwing away the prospect of marriage. Nonetheless, he is willing
to accept this gamble purely because of search frictions and what one might
call the "bird in hand" e¤ect. Now, a job o¤er is deemed acceptable by an
unemployed single man even if it precludes marriage, given the relatively high
threshold set by women. Nonetheless, such a wage may still be su¢ ciently
high so that an unemployed turns down the option of holding out for even
higher (but unlikely) o¤ers.
For higher and higher female reservation matches the likelihood of en-
countering such increasingly high wages decreases further, since 1   Fi(T )
decreases, and with it, mens reservation wage. Reservation wages gradually
fall, to the point where men give up completely and rely on pure luck - after
all, even the man who sets the lowest possible reservation wage may still be
able to get married if he accidentally lands a good job.
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3.3 Equilibrium with Marriage Premia
A search equilibrium is a system fRi; T;Ni; Gi(:); Bi; Ei(:);Mig, where the
reservation wage function is summarised in Proposition 1, T is obtained
from (7), while the various steady state measures of men, together with the
distributions of earned wages result from inow-outow equations (2) - (6).
Recall that the marriage premium for type i men (MPi) has been dened
as the di¤erence between the average wage earned by type i married men
and the average wage of type i single men. Denoting the former by ewMi and
the latter by ewSi , we simply have MPi  ewMi   ewSi .
An equilibrium with zero marriage premium for all men is less relevant
from an empirical point of view. Therefore, we focus on equilibria that
exhibit a positive marital wage premium for at least one type. Crucially,
such equilibria allow us to compare marriage premia across types.
Note that in the context of our model, to obtain a measurable marriage
wage di¤erential in the rst place it must be true that at least some men can
indeed get married. We work under the assumption that this is the case, so
T < wi for all i. Also, let bTH < wL for now. Straight away, one can establish
the link between reservation wages and marital wage di¤erences.
Lemma 1 MPi > 0 for Ri < T , and MPi = 0 for Ri = T .
Proof. Note that
ewSi = BiBi +Ni
Z T
Ri
wdEi(w) +
Ni
Bi +Ni
Z wi
T
wdGi(w)
and ewMi = Z wi
T
wdGi(w):
For T = Ri, we have Bi = 0 and Ei(w) collapses to zero, so ewMi = ewSi . On
the other hand, for T > Ri, we have Bi > 0; and hence ewMi > ewSi .
Please note the importance of the above result: a positive marriage pre-
mium is possible only if the region where Ri < T exists. In turn, as shown
above, this can occur only when there are search frictions in the labour mar-
ket. Obviously, marriage market search frictions are also needed if one is to
talk about a meaningful reservation match T .
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Theorem 1 Let bxi such that T (bxi) = bTi, x such that T (x) = RH , and x
such that T (x) = wL.
Then, for x 2 [x; x], there always is a non-empty set of parameter val-
ues for which a unique equilibrium exists where only employed men can get
married and both productivity types do. The potential equilibra are as follows:
(a) An equilibrium with MPL > MPH > 0 obtains i¤ x 2 (bxH ; x);
(b) An equilibrium with MPL > MPH = 0 obtains i¤ x 2 (bxL; bxH);
(c) An equilibrium with MPi = 0 obtains i¤ x 2 ( x; bxL).
Proof. We have established that RH and RL are continuous and non-
monotonic, and it is easy to show that Ri < bTi < wi. Furthermore, we
know that T is independent of Ri. Together, these guarantee the existence
of an unique equilibrium.
Since @T=@x > 0 and RH < bTL < bTH , we have x < bxL < bxH < x.
For x 2 [x; x], we have Ri < T < wL and therefore in an equilibrium only
employed men can get married, and both L and H types do so as long as
they earn a high enough wage.
For bxH < x < x we have bTH < T < wL, RH > RL and T > Ri for all i.
From Lemma 1, T > Ri implies there is a marriage premium for both types.
Furthermore, RH > RL means that, for a given T , the marriage premium is
lower for H type men.
For bxL < x < bxH we have bTL < T < bTH , RH R RL, T > RL and T = RH .
By Lemma 1, T > RL implies that there is a marriage premium for L type
men but, as T = RH , the H types do not exhibit a marriage premium.
Finally, for x < x < bxL we have wH < T < bTL and Ri = T . Using
Lemma 1 again, this means no marriage wage premium for either type.
Figure 1 plots T and Ri and captures equilibrium (a). The intersection
point between the relevant best response functions captures the equilibrium
where both productivity types exhibit (positive) male marriage wage pre-
mium.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Theorem 1 contains very strong results which predict that the marriage
premium among more productive men is lower than that among less produc-
tive men. Such an equilibrium outcome is possible (and hence observable)
only if there are search frictions in the labour market, which are necessary
for the non-monotonicity of the reservation wage function.
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For completeness, note that if bTH > wL, this only restricts the set of
equilibria in which both types of men can marry in principle, but otherwise
our qualitative results carry through. The full round-up of the potential
equilibria in this case is relegated to Appendix B.
4 Classes
In what follows, we extend the model in three directions. First, we introduce
a continuum of male types. Second, we consider female heterogeneity in
the marriage market. Third, we also allow for the scenario where women
are willing to marry unemployed men. These additional features allow for a
richer set of results: male marriage premium patterns are now equilibrium
outcomes that result not only from optimal constrained sequential job search,
but also from a process of endogenous marital class formation.
To that end, assume that women are characterised by a measure of at-
tractiveness y in the marriage market. One can think of this as any non
wage-related quality that is valued by men. Men rank potential marital
partners identically, and let y be distributed according to the cumulative
distribution function H(y) with support [y; y].
In turn, men are indexed by type p, and each type p has a mass u.6
Let p take values between p and p. Men of type p face an exogenous wage
distribution Fp(:) with support [w(p); w(p)], with w(p) = p and w(p) = p+z,
where z > 0. Another natural assumption is that Fp(w) < Fp0(w) for p > p0.
Given this, one can associate higher type p with higher productivity.
Men and women choose reservation matches and subsequently marriage
classes form endogenously. To keep the analysis simple, we construct an
equilibrium with two classes only. That is, the population of men and women
will endogenously divide into two sets: men from male Set 1 marry women
from the female Set 1, and men from male Set 2 marry women from the
female Set 2. Following that, Class 1 will contain highly desirable women
paired up with very productive and/or high earning men, while Class 2 will
have couples made up of less desirable women matched with less productive
6Having equal measures of each type amounts to having a uniform distribution of
types, with density 1p p .
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and/or low earning men. The reservation match strategies of men and women
are derived in detail below, but for now, a quick overview is probably helpful.
Following our earlier analysis, men who ignore the marriage market (ei-
ther because they can, or because they have no choice) set a reservation wage
R(p).
Employed or unemployed men from Set 1 who are accepted by all women
choose reservation match y1. In turn, employed or unemployed men from
Set 2 who are only accepted by women from female Set 2 choose reservation
match y2. These reservation values are such that y1 2 [y; y] and y2 < y.
As we do not rule out unemployed men being able to get married, let y(p)
denote the reservation match of a type p unemployed.
Similarly, the measure n1 of Set 1 women choose reservation wage T1,
while women from Set 2 (measure n2) choose reservation wage T2. We limit
our analysis to the case where T1 < p+ z, and note at this point that n1 and
n2 are of course endogenously determined.
To keep the dynamics simple, we assume that a y type woman is replaced
by another woman of the same type whenever she gets married or exits the
market. As a consequence, we can treat the total measure and distribution
of single women as exogenous and are able to normalise it to 1 without any
loss of generality. Hence, the measure of women in Set 1 (n1) is simply
[1 H (y1)], while the measure of Set 2 women (n2) is H(y1).
Given the reservation wage strategies R(p), as well as R(p), T1 and T2 as
dened above, the male population will split into groups, based on type and
wage. More specically, dene threshold productivities p1; p2; p3 such that:
R(p1) = T1 (10)
bT (p2) = T1 (11)
and
p3 = T1   z (12)
Then, we we obtain the following groups of men:
(i) Men with p 2 [p1; p] can a¤ord not to care about the marriage market.
These men can marry anyone, even when unemployed, and for them it is also
true that y = y1.
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(ii) Men with p 2 [p2; p1) set R(p) = T1 because bT (p2) = T1. These men
can - once they get a job - marry women from Set 1. While unemployed,
they may be willing to marry a woman from Set 2 if her y is high enough:
that is, higher than y(p).
(iii) Men with p 2 [p3; p2) will chance it in the sense that they set R(p) <
T1. If they are lucky and land a wage w  T1, they subsequently have access
to women from Set 1.
(iv) Men below p3 can not hope to marry women from Set 1, since a p3
type man has w(p3) = T1. Their only chance is women from Set 2. Note
that for these men to exist, we require that p < p3, so we work under this
scenario.
Next, dene p such that a Set 2 woman is indi¤erent between staying
single or marrying an unemployed p man. With p < p3, Set 2 women are
willing to marry at least some men with p < p3. Indeed, if p < p, Set 2
women will in fact marry all unemployed men with p < p3. As we will see,
this condition ensures there is a second class in which some male types (those
with p < p3) have zero marriage wage premium.
Please note that constructing such a bottom class is by no means trivial.
Firstly, this is because both p and p3 are in fact endogenous. Secondly,
women from Set 2 could in principle nd partners from three groups of single
men: those with p 2 [p; p3), those with p 2 [p3; p2) who are chancing it and
are either unemployed or unlucky, as well as those who, while holding out
for a wage that ensures marriageability to a Set 1 woman, may nonetheless
be willing to marry some Set 2 women instead. Indeed, a Set 2 woman with
attractiveness y will be accepted by men with productivity no higher than
p0, where p0 2 [p2; p1) is dened as the productivity p for which y(p) = y.
4.1 Search
In this section we characterise the optimal reservation wage and/or match
strategy for men, together with the optimal reservation match strategy for
women. We assume p < T1 < p+ z.
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4.1.1 Men
Employed men with w  T1 These are single men with p 2 [p3; p], and
the pool contains those who are very high type (so can ignore the marriage
market), those who held out for a wage no lower than T1, and those who
chanced it but were lucky and obtained a marriageable wage. Having access
to all women, these men only accept women with y  y1.
Let V S1 (w) denote their value of being single and employed at wage w 
T1, and V M(w; y) denote their value of being married to a type y woman.
Then, V M(w; y) = w+y
r+
and:
(r + )V S1 (w) = w + n1
yZ
y1
[V M(w; y)  V S1 (w)]dH
0
(y); (13)
where:
H
0
(y) =
H(y) H(y1)
1 H(y1) and n1 = 1 H(y1). (14)
The interpretation is straightforward: a single man who earns a wage w
meets a desirable woman from Set 1 at rate n1 and gets married. Alterna-
tively, one can rewrite the above as:
V S1 (w) =
w
r + 
+

[r +  + (1 H(y1))](r + )
yZ
y1
ydH(y) (15)
From the denition of a reservation match, we have:
V M(w; y1) = V
S
1 (w)
Using this, we obtain:
y1 =

r + 
yZ
y1
[1 H(y)] dy (16)
The interpretation is standard, as the right-hand side reects the oppor-
tunity cost of continued search in the marriage market.
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Employed men with w < T1 These are single men with p 2 [p; p2),
and the group includes men with p 2 [p3; p2) - those who chanced it but were
unlucky and ended up with an unappealing wage, as well as those with p < p3
- men who were hopeless to start with. All these men can only marry women
with attractiveness y lower than y1. By construction, they will accept them
all, so there is no third class. This means that V M(w; y)  V S2 (w), where
V S2 (w) denotes the value of being single for these men, obtained from:
(r + )V S2 (w) = w + n2
y1Z
y2
[V M(w; y)  V S2 (w)]dH
00
(y); (17)
where:
H
00
(y) =
H(y)
H(y1)
and n2 = H(y1) (18)
Alternatively, we can write:
V S2 (w) =
w
r + 
+

[r +  + H(y1)] (r + )
y1Z
y
ydH(y) (19)
Again, equating V S2 (w) and V
M(w; y2), one obtains the reservation match
implicitly:
y2 =

r + 
y1Z
y2
[H(y1) H(y)]dy (20)
Given the above, in order to satisfy y2 < y , we need:
y >

r +  + H(y1)
Z y1
y
ydH(y)
Unemployed men These are single men who choose a reservation match
y(p) in the marriage market as well as a reservation wage R(p) in the labour
market.
From our previous analysis of the constrained sequential job search prob-
lem, we know there are two important ranges of relevant reservation wages.
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(a) Unemployed men with p 2 [p2; p1) who choose R(p) = T1.
Recall that as soon as any unemployed gets married, he subsequently sets
R(p) equal to R(p). As a consequence, Set 1 women do not marry them in the
rst place. Nonetheless, while unemployed, these men do set a reservation
match y(p) which may or may not be lower than y2.
Denote the value of unemployment of these men by U1(p), and also note
that, once they nd a wage higher than or equal to T1, their value of un-
employment is lower than the value of employment: U1(p) < T1(r+) . After
nding such a wage, their reservation match is set at y1 and therefore while
unemployed, their reservation match y(p) must be less than y1.
Since unemployed men drop their reservation wage toR(p) after marriage,
their value of being jobless but married is:
V M(R(p); y) =
R(p) + y
r + 
The discounted lifetime utility of being married while unemployed reects
the fact that once a man gets married his reservation wage drops to R(p).
In turn, their value of being unemployed is:
(r + )U1(p) = 0 [1  Fp(T1)]
w(p)Z
T1
[V S1 (w)  U1(p)]dFp(wjw > T1)+
+n2[H(y1) H(y(p))]
y1Z
y(p)

V M(R(p); y)  U1(p)

dH(yjy1 > y > y(p))
As mentioned, these unemployed men are not acceptable to Set 1 women.
Nonetheless, they can of course look for a job and only accept it if the wage
o¤ered is above T1 - in which case they become marriageable to Set 1 women.
Alternatively, they could meet a Set 2 woman who will accept them despite
the fact that they are unemployed. However, these men will only accept such
women if in turn they have a su¢ ciently high y. This particular reservation
match y(p) solves:
V M(R(p); y(p)) = U1(p)
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From the denition of a reservation wage, a jobless man is indi¤erent between
continued job search while single and marriage to a y
Next, using V S1 (w) = V
M(w; y1) together with U1(p) = V M(R(p); y(p)),
and integrating by parts, we obtain y implicitly:7
y(p) =
0
r + 
w(p)Z
T1
[1  Fp(w)] dw + (21)
+
0
r + 
[1  Fp(T1)] [y1   y(p)] +
+
n2
r + 
y1Z
y(p)
[H(y1) H(y)] dy  R(p)
The male reservation match has to compensate for: (i) the standard
option of continued search for better wages while unemployed; (ii) the possi-
bility of an utility gain (in terms of y) from potentially nding a wage higher
than T1 that allows a partnership with a Set 1 woman; and (iii) the option of
continued search for women with higher y. These three e¤ects are mitigated
by the option of dropping the reservation wage to R(p) if in the position to
get married while unemployed.
We can further characterise this reservation match y(p). First, a simple
implicit derivation of the y equation shows that @y(p)=@p > 0. Second,
one can show that if y2  y, then y(p)  y for p 2 (p3; p2]. To see this,
consider men with p 2 (p3; p2). Denote their value of unemployment by
U2(p), and observe that V S2 =
R(p)
r+
= U2(p). If y2 is their reservation match
while employed (that is, when enjoying utility V S2 ), then it is also y2 while
jobless (that is, when enjoying utility U2(p) = V S2 ).
Note that in principle, y(p) can be higher or less than y. To explore
this further, dene p0 such that y(p0) = y. From the above, we know that
p0 > p2.8 For p0 > p1, all men with p 2 (p2; p1) set y(p) < y and are willing to
7We present the implicit version as it has a more intuitive interpretation, but note
that y(p) can easily be derived explicitly.
8For p = p2 we have R(p2; T1) = T1, so it is true that V s1 (R(p2)) =
R(p2)
r+ = U(p2).
The reservation match of these men is y2 < y.
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marry all women. For p0 < p1; men with p 2 (p2; p0) also set y(p) < y, while
men with p 2 (p0; p1) set y(p) > y and only accept women with y > y(p0),
where y(p0) > y.
(b) Unemployed men with p 2 [p3; p2) who choose R(p) < T1.
These men are willing to accept wages that put them in the male Set 2.
Of course, they may still be lucky and nd wages that get them into Set 1,
giving access to Set 1 women. Their value of unemployment is U2(p), where
(r + )U2(p) =
0 [Fp(T1)  Fp(R(p))]
T1Z
R(p)
[V S2 (w)  U2(p)]dFp(wjR(p) < w < T1) +
+0 [1  Fp(T1)]
w(p)Z
T1
[V S1 (w)  U2(p)]dFp(wjw > T1) +
+n2
y1Z
y

V M(R(p); y)  U2(p)

dH(yjy < y1)
These men could: a) accept a wage less than T1 that puts them in Set 2,
b) nd a job that puts them in Set 1, or c) nd an acceptable Set 2 woman
and get married. The latter implies that for these men, y(p)  y: jobless
or not, they nd Set 2 women desirable. Having accepted R(p), they set
y(p)  y, and they are indi¤erent between unemployment and employment
at wage R(p).
Once again, recall that if a jobless man gets married, subsequently his
reservation wage drops to R(p). Hence, the value of being married while un-
employed is again V M(R(p); y) = R(p)+y
(r+)
. From the denition of a reservation
wage, and using V S1 (w) and V
S
2 (w), as well as n2 = H(y1), we obtain:
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R(p) =
0
r +  + H(y1)
w(p)Z
R(p)
[1  Fp(w)] dw + (22)
+
0(r + )
r +  + H(y1)
[1  Fp(T1)]

V S1 (w)  V S2 (w)

+
+

r +  + H(y1)
y1Z
y
[R(p) + y]dH(y) (< T1).
The terms on the right hand side reect that the reservation wage has
to compensate for: (i) the standard option of continued search for better
wages, (ii) the foregoing of the potential to marry a Set 1 woman (and the
acceptance of only being able to marry Set 2 women), as well as (iii) the
option of marrying a Set 2 woman while unemployed.
(c) Unemployed men with p 2 [p1; p] and unemployed men with p 2 [p; p3).
Recall that p1 is such that R(p1) = T1. Therefore, men with p > p1 need
not worry about marriage, since R(p) > T1, so they set their reservation wage
equal to R(p).
4.1.2 Women
Women in Set 1 These women only marry men whose wages are higher
than T1. The pool of such eligible singles is made up of the following:
i) a measure Np of single employed men with p > p1, whose wages are
higher than T1;
ii) a measure u [p  p1] of single unemployed men with p > p1, who have
reservation wages R(p) > T1;
iii) a measure N 0p of single employed men with p 2 [p2; p1), who have held
out for a wage at least as high as T1;
iv) a measure N 0p of single employed men with p 2 [p3; p2), who chanced
it, were lucky and are now earning a wage w  T1.9
9The last two measures are equal because the wage distributions are exogenous.
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Using steady-state equations analogous to the ones in Section 3, we obtain
the measures and distribution of earned wages for eligible men 10:
Gp(w) =
Fp(w)  Fp(T1)
1  Fp(T1) (23)
Np =
u0[1  Fp(R(p))]
n1 + 
(24)
N
0
p =
u0[1  Fp(T1)]
n1 + 
(25)
Given the above, for a woman in Set 1 the value of being single is:
(r + )W S1 = 	
pZ
p1
Np
264 wpZ
R(p)

w
r + 
 W S1

dGp(w)
375 dp+ (26)
+	u [p  p1]
pZ
p1

R(p)
r + 
 W S1

dp+
+
min(p1;p)Z
p2
N 0p
24wpZ
T1

w
r + 
 W S1

dGp(w)
35 dp+
+
min(p2;p)Z
p3
N 0p
24wpZ
T1

w
r + 
 W S1

dGp(w)
35 dp;
where 	 = 1 for p > p1 and 	 = 0 otherwise.
From the above, and using the denition of a reservation wageW S1 =
T1
r+
,
we obtain T1 implicitly:
10The steady state measures of bachelors (Bp) and married men (Mp), together with
their respective distributions of earned wages are obtained from inow-outow equations
similar to the ones in Section 3.
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[r +  + u(p  p1)] T1
r + 
= (27)
= 	
pZ
p1
264 u0
(n1 + )(r + )
wpZ
R(p)
[1  Fp(w)] dw
375 dp+
+	u(p  p1)
pZ
p1
R(p)
r + 
dp+
+
min(p1;p)Z
p2
24 u0
(n1 + ) (r + )
wpZ
T1
[1  Fp(w)] dw
35 dp+
+
min(p2;p)Z
p3
24 u0
(n1 + ) (r + )
wpZ
T1
[1  Fp(w)] dw
35 dp
Women in Set 2 These women have no access to Set 1 men. As a conse-
quence (and allowing for p 7 p), a Set 2 woman with attractiveness y will
only accept a man from the following pool:
i) a measure N 00p of single and employed men with p 2 [p3;min(p2; p)]
who chanced it but were unlucky and now earn w < T1;
ii) a measure u[p3   max(p; p)] of single unemployed men with p 2
[max(p; p); p2) who - while unemployed - cannot marry Set 1 women. These
are men who are yet to nd a job: men with p3 < p < p2 who are chancing
it, or men with p > p2 who set their reservation wage equal to T1;
iii) a measure u [(p0(y)  p2] of single unemployed men with p 2 [p2; p0(y)],
whith p0(y) being the productivity p for which y(p) = y. These are men
who - while unemployed - are once again refused by Set 1 women, and whose
productivity is low enough so they accept a woman with attractiveness y.
Note that p, as previously dened, is obtained implicitly from R(p
)
r+
=
W S2 . The steady state measureN
00
p and theG
0(w) distribution of wages earned
by these men are obtained from the straightforward steady state equations:
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u0 [Fp(w)  Fp(R(p))] = G0p(w)N
00
p ( + n2)
and
u0 [Fp(T1)  Fp(R(p))] = N 00p ( + n2) :
Thus, we obtain:
G0p(w) =
Fp(w)  Fp(R(p))
Fp(T1)  Fp(R(p)) (28)
and
N 00p =
u0[Fp(T1)  Fp(R(p))]
 + n2
(29)
With p < p3, and given the relevant combined pool of single men, the
value of being single for a Set 2 woman is therefore:
(r + )W S2 (y) =
min(p2;p)Z
p3
N 00p
T1Z
R(p)

w
r + 
 W S2

dG0p(w)dp+
+u[p3  max(p; p)]
p3Z
max(p;p)

R(p)
r + 
 W S2

dp+
+
u [(p0(y)  p2]
p0(y)Z
p2

R(p)
r + 
 W S2

dp; (30)
where 
 = 1 for p0(y) > p2 and 
 = 0 otherwise.
Note that p > p implies that R(p
)
r+
= W S2 , and therefore T2 = R(p
). On
the other hand, for p < p, we have W S2 >
R(p)
r+
(= T2
r+
).
4.2 Equilibrium with classes
Below, we rst dene an equilibrium with two classes, where the bottom class
is characterised by zero marriage premium. This is essentially a summary of
the best response strategies and steady-state variables derived in the previous
section. Following that, we discuss the necessary existence conditions, and
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show (using a numerical solution) that such an equilibrium indeed exists. We
also generalise our main qualitative result to any number of classes. Finally,
we provide a full characterisation of possible marriage premia patterns across
male productivity types as well as marriage classes.
Given the denition of p1; p2; p3, and together with steady-state measures
of various men and women, as well as earned wages, a steady-state search
equilibrium with two classes is essentially a system:
fT1; T2; R(p); R(p); y1; y2; y(p); pg ;
such that:
(i) Womens reservation matches satisfy:
T1 = (r + )W
S
1 (w)
and
T2 = R(p
) for p > p, or
T2 < (r + )W
S
2 (w) for p
 < p;
where W Sj (w) as dened (with j = 1; 2).
(ii) Type p unemployed mens reservation wages and reservation matches
depend on whether or not they take the marriage market into account:
(a) If they ignore the marriage market:
R(p) =
0
r + 
Z wp
R(p)
[1  Fp(w)] dw
(b) If they take the marriage market into account:
R(p) = T1 and
y(p) =
0
r + 
w(p)Z
T1
[1  F (w)] dw + 0
r + 
[1  Fp(T1)] [y1   y(p)] +
+
n2
r + 
y1Z
y(p)
[H(y1) H(y)] dy  R(p)
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or
R(p) =
0
r +  + H(y1)
w(p)Z
R(p)
[1  Fp(w)] dw +
+
0(r + )
r +  + H(y1)
[1  F (T1)]

V S1 (w)  V S2 (w)

+
+

r +  + H(y1)
y1Z
y
[R(p) + y]dH(y) (< T1).
(iii) Employed mens reservation matches are:
y1 =

r + 
yZ
y1
[1 H(y)] dy if w  T1
and
y2 =

r + 
y1Z
y2
[H(y1) H(y)]dy if w < T1.
(iv) Threshold male type psatises:
R(p)
r + 
= W S2
4.2.1 Existence and characterisation:
Theorem 2 The set of parameters for which a two-class search equilibrium
with zero male marriage premium in the bottom class exists is non-empty.
Such an equilibrium exhibits p < p3, and exists if p < p < p3 and y > y0,
where y0 = y2(y0):
Proof. All choice variables are continuous, and the equilibrium equations are
twice-di¤erentiable. To show existence, it is enough to provide a numerical
solution and nd a set of such equilibrium parameters (see Appendix C).
To characterise this equilibrium, rst assume that p > p3. Then, all men
in Set 2 - those with p 2 (p; p3) - will chance it, so for these men the marriage
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premium is positive. Some males (those with p < p) would constitute a third
set of men, but they would never marry.
The condition y > y0 simply says that Set 2 men are willing to marry all
women not in Set 1, so there is no third female set. These women make up
Set 2, which is therefore also the bottom set. Note that y2 is positive and
independent of y when y < y2. In addition, y2 is increasing in y when y > y2.
Hence, y0 > 0, and therefore it is always possible to choose a y 2  y0; y1 such
that y > y2. Consequently, set 2 men are willing to marry all women not in
Set 1, which makes Set 2 the only other (bottom) female set. This also rules
out a third class.
Next, assume that p > p3, so even the lowest type men chance it. But then
there is always a positive marriage premium. Instead, assume p < p3. This
implies T1 > R(p), and hence set 1 women reject some men. In particular,
a set 1 woman will never marry an unemployed of type p3, or indeed any
unemployed of even lower type. From the equation for T1 it is clear that
T1 < p + z as long as  is not innite. Since p3 = T1   z, we have p > p3.
This ensures that there are unemployed men who chance it, and hence it
rules out a one-class equilibrium. Note that p < p3 would mean that all
unemployed men ignored T1, which would then make this T1 sub-optimal for
women. Women would set a lower reservation match, and this lower T1 would
in turn lead to the existence of additional sets of men. Since @p3=@p = 0 for
p < p3, one can always choose a low enough p which satises the above
condition. Together with p < p, this ensures that the second class is in fact
the bottom class, as there are only two sets of each gender. Finally, p < p
also implies that Set 2 women marry all Set 2 men, even if these men are
unemployed, meaning zero marriage premium.
Figure 2 below illustrates a search equilibrium with two marital classes
and associated marriage premium patterns:
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
For reasons of tractability, so far we have only focused on a two-class
search equilibrium. However, this is without any loss of generality, either in
terms of endogenous class formation11 or in terms of having a zero marriage
premium for men in a bottom class - that is, bottom among any number of
classes. Indeed, we have the following result:
11As shown by Burdett and Coles (1997).
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Corollary 1 Let K be the number of marriage classes and let pK dened by
R(pK) = TK. In any search equilibrium with K classes, p

K < TK   z and
the men in the bottom class have zero marriage premium.
Proof. Assume K classes. Then, any equilibrium with pK < TK   z is such
that MP = 0 amongst some men in the Kth class, simply because p can
always be chosen such that p < p < p3. With two classes, pK < TK   z is
actually p < T1   z = p3.
4.2.2 Marriage premia across productivities and classes
Finally, we summarise the marriage premia patterns pertaining to men of
various productivities as well as across classes in a two-class equilibrium.
(A) Men with extremely high productivity (p > p1, for whom R(p) >
T1) can ignore the labour market. They qualify for male Set 1 even when
unemployed. As a consrquence, they only marry women with y > y1 and
form Class 1 partnerships with such Set 1 women. The marriage premium
of these men is zero, due to the fact that labour market status is simply
irrelevant for their prospects in the marriage market.
(B) Highly productive men (with p2  p < p1) will not accept wages that
put them in Set 2. They choose R(p) = T1. If (and only if) they nd such
an acceptable wage, they are able to marry Set 1 women and form Class
1 partnerships with them. There is no marriage wage premium associated
with marriage to Set 1 women. However, there is a marriage wage penalty
associated with marriage to Set 2 women. Recall that although these men
only accept wages that put them in Set 1, while unemployed they belong to
the male Set 2, as only Set 2 women accept them. Given this, they could
end up marrying a Set 2 woman who has a high enough y. Following that,
however, their reservation wage goes down to R(p), which in turn generates
the marriage penalty.
(C) Mid-productivity men (with p3  p < p2) choose R(p) < T1, and
are therefore willing to accept wages that put them in male Set 2. Despite
that, they can be lucky and still nd a wage that puts them in male Set 1.
In that case, there is a positive marriage premium associated with marrying
Set 1 women and forming Class 1 couples. In contrast, marriage to a Set 2
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woman leads to a marriage penalty. However, note that this penalty is lower
than that of the highly productive men discussed above. This is because this
earnings penalty pertains to employed men with wages between R(p) and T1:
these men nd a job rst, and only after that, a Set 2 female partner. This
is in addition to those men who nd a Set 2 partner rst, subsequently drop
their reservation wage to R(p) and then nd a job.
(D) Low productivity men can nd themselves in two situations:
(i) if p < p < p3, the highest available wage for those having p 2
(p; p3) is lower than T1. Because of this, they ignore T1 and choose R(p)
as their reservation wage. For all these men, the chosen reservation wage is
higher than T2, therefore Set 2 women marry them irrespective of whether
they are employed or unemployed. This leads to the formation of Class 2
partnerships. Importantly, there is no marriage premium associated with
these men.
(ii) if p < p < p3, men with p 2 (p; p3) cannot marry Set 1 women
but are nonetheless accepted by Set 2 women, even while jobless. Conse-
quently, the marriage wage premium for these men is again zero. Sadly, men
with p 2 (p; p) can never get married.
5 Empirical evidence
Theorem 1 o¤ers clear predictions about the ranking of marriage premia
across men of di¤erent productivity - that less educated cohorts should be
characterised by a higher marriage wage premium (MP ). In turn, the results
in Section 4 strongly suggest a marriage market characterised by classes
where this pattern of MP is broken by a bottom class characterised by a zero
marriage wage premium (MP ). Together, these theoretical predictions o¤er
a good basis for an empirical test.
Our primary aim in this section is to estimate theMP for a heterogeneous
male workforce in order to recognise patterns ofMP that could o¤er support
to the theoretical framework, be it with or without two sided heterogeneity.
We use educational attainment as proxy for productivity, with higher levels
of education representing higher levels of productivity. We estimate our
MP by regressing wages on marital status, controlling for a range of other
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factors, using both OLS and xed e¤ects. The latter method uses the within-
transformation to sweep out time-invariant individual heterogeneity and is
recommended for estimating the MP - for details, see Cornwell and Rupert
(1995).
In addition, we also look for patterns of classes on the marriage market
that exhibit the male wage premia suggested by our theoretical model.
5.1 Data
We use two sources of data from the UK: the National Child Development
Survey (NCDS) and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The NCDS
is a cohort study that has followed a cohort of 17,000 individuals born in a
single week in 1958 in England, Scotland and Wales. Data were collected
on individuals throughout their lives and we use data from waves 4, 5, 6, 7
and 8 when the individuals were aged 23, 33, 42, 46 and 50. The BHPS was
collected between 1991 and 2008 and covered England and Wales, as well as
parts of Scotland (later all of Scotland) and Northern Ireland. Data were
collected initially on around 5,000 households, leading to around 10,000 in-
terviews. Individuals were followed over time, and as individuals moved into
new households all individuals in the new households were also interviewed.
We use data from all 18 waves of the BHPS.
There are several advantages to using these two datasets. Firstly, since
they are longitudinal, it is possible to control for time invariant unobservable
heterogeneity by using xed e¤ects estimations methods. Secondly, they
contain information required for the estimation of wage equations, including
information on individual educational attainment. Thirdly, they provide
di¤erent insights into the empirical problem. The BHPS contains individuals
from di¤erent ages, meaning that for di¤erent age cohorts there may be
di¤erent labour market experiences. The NCDS contains individuals of the
same age, so the cohort experience will be common across all individuals.
Given the di¤erence in the characterisitcs of the data, using both databases
can constitute a test of the robustness of the empirical results.
For our estimation we have focussed on men who are either single or
are in their rst marriage and who are working full time. Individuals are
categorised into four groups by education status. The four groups are 1) No
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qualications, 2) School leavers qualications (qualications obtained at the
school leaving age of 16), 3) Higher school leavers qualications (these are
qualications that are above those for age 16 but lower than degree level,
and 4) Higher education qualications - degree and above.
The key outcome variable for this study is wages. In the NCDS individ-
uals are asked to report their usual net pay and the period that this applies
to allowing us to calculate net pay per week which we then deate (to 1987
prices) and log. For the BHPS we construct logged, deated (to 1987 prices)
monthly income. We also include controls for age (BHPS), region of resi-
dence, social class (a marker of status based on occupation), health status12,
sector of employment and wave dummies. For the BHPS we also have full
information across waves on size of employer, experience and union status.
Summary statistics for the two samples are given in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
In Table 1 we see that individuals in the NCDS sample are more likely to
be married than those in the BHPS. This may be due to the age di¤erence
between the two datasets, with the average age in the BHPS sample being
around 34, whereas the NCDS sample were all 50 in 2008. Other di¤erences
include the proportion of the population with a degree, reecting greater ed-
ucational opportunities for younger age groups in the BHPS data. Also, the
proportion of individuals reporting excellent health is higher in the NCDS,
reecting the di¤erent categories available when answering the self-assessed
health question. Lastly we can see that in the BHPS a greater propor-
tion work in the private sector and there is a larger share of the population
grouped around higher social classes.
Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 give the summary statistics by each of the education
groups. We can see that individuals with degrees have, on average higher
incomes, are in better health, less likely to be in the private sector and more
likely to be of high social class. As we move down the educational groups
income falls and individuals are more likely to be in a lower social class
classication.
[Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 about here]
12For the BHPS in wave 9 the health question was di¤erent from the other waves, we
estimate models including and excluding wave 9 data and nd that it makes little di¤erence
to the results.
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5.2 Methods
Initially, we estimate the marriage wage premium for all individuals using
xed e¤ects, which controls for unobservable heterogeneity and also removes
all time invariant variables, such as education status, from the model. We
follow Cornwell and Rupert (1995) and estimate a wage equation of the form:
ln(wit) = Mit + 
0Xit + i + "it;
where the dependent variable is the log of income, Mit is an indicator
showing whether an individual is married, and Xit is a matrix of control
variables.13 In turn, i captures time-invariant individual heterogeneity and
"it is the standard idiosyncratic error term. The unknown parameter  is to
estimated and interpreted: if a marriage wage premium exists then  will be
positive and signicant.
5.3 Results
We estimated the equation above for the full sample and for each of educa-
tion categories, bearing in mind the results from Theorem 1 (that the MP
increases for less productive cohorts throughout the whole range), and The-
orem 2 (that the increase in MP for less productive cohorts is broken in the
last class, which is characterised by a zero male marriage premium).
The results are presented in Table 6. The rst row of results shows the
marriage wage premium for the whole samples for the NCDS and the BHPS.
The remaining rows show the results for each of the education groups.
[Table 6 about here]
Overall, we can see the existence of a marriage wage premium and that is
highly signicant, for the whole sample. When we consider the estimation by
education group, and starting with the most educated men, we observe the
gradient, just as predicted by both versions of our model. In both samples,
the estimate is close to zero and not signicant among men with degree. It
becomes signicant and increasing as we move to men with "below degree"
and this pattern continues as we move to "school leavers".
13For both datasets these are: region of residence, wave dummies, sector of employment,
social class, health status and family size. The BHPS also includes age, size of employer,
experience and union status.
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However, there is a break in this pattern as we move to men with no
qualications, for whom the estimates are again insignicant, reecting no
marriage premium among these men. This nding suggests the existence of
classes, whereby women in the lowest class and men with lowest productiv-
ity/education have no option except to marry each other - and they do so
regardless of their characteristics.
In Table 7 we investigate the characteristics of mens partners in order to
check if they di¤er across the productivity range. In particular, we focus on
the characteristics of the partners of men in the lowest productivity group.
Our conjecture regarding classes and the existence of no marriage wage pre-
mium for the lowest productivity group would be supported if women married
to these men display worse characteristics, on average, than women married
to men in the other productivity groups.14
For the NCDS study we have data on the partners years of education
and the partners social class. For the latter measure we simply use the 6
point scale (where 1 is the highest social class and 6 is the lowest social class)
in our regression. Since our aim is simply to highlight di¤erences between
prodictivity groups, it does not matter that we linearise this variable. For the
BHPS we have information on a partners highest education qualication, a
partners hourly income and a partners parental social class. For education
we focus on those with no qualications and those with a degree (the extremes
of the education qualications) and for social class we again linearise the 6
point scale, where 1 is the highest social class and 6 is the lowest social class.
[Table 7 about here]
Examining Table 7, we can see that in both data sets, the lowest pro-
ductivity men (those with no qualications) are married to women with the
worst characteristics, whichever way they are measured. Men with no quali-
cations are married to women with lower average years of education (in the
NCDS) or women who are less likely to have a degree and more likely to have
no qualication (in the BHPS). These women have, on average, lower social
class status (NCDS) or their parental social class status is signicantly lower
(BHPS). For the BHPS we can also see that if these women are working
they earn, on average, a lower average wage than women married to men in
14The sample sizes do not match our earlier analysis since the data for partners is not
complete, leading to a number of missing cases.
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higher productivity groups. These results provide empirical support for the
existence of classes, where men in the lowest productivity group and women
in the lowest class have no option but to marry each other. A consequence
of that marriage pattern would be the absence of any male marriage wage
premium in the bottom class, a conjecture that is in accordance with our
empirical results.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we argue that search frictions in labour and marriage markets
can explain the puzzling phenomenon of male marriage premium. If men
looking for jobs also take into account the expectations of women in the
marriage market, their optimal reservation wages could end up being less
than the wage required to make them marriageable. This is simply because,
if the male wage that ensures success in the marriage market is too high,
men may end up setting a relatively low reservation wage. Of course, this
in itself does not mean that they are all conned to remain single. Some of
them may still land jobs with marriageable wages. This, together with the
low reservation wage creates a wedge between wages earned by married and
single men: the male marriage premium.
At the heart of our explanation lies the fact that behaviour and outcomes
in the labour market may be determined by expectations in the marriage
market (and vice-versa). As in frictional labour markets earned wages are
essentially determined by reservation wages set by job seekers, and in turn
these earned wages a¤ect the marriage prospects of men, the marriage pre-
mium arises naturally in a search equilibrium.
Importantly, in our story men are able to get married because they earn
high enough wages, and not the other way round. In other words, we rule out
the scenario according to which married men earn higher wages (due to an
ex-post productivity increase generated by specialisation with a household
household specialisation).
Equally importantly, the model allows us to examine the role of ex-ante
productivity di¤erences. Using a framework that incorporates male produc-
tivity heterogeneity, we establish that the marital wage gap can be an equilib-
rium outcome. This suggests that productivity di¤erentials are not necessary
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for explaining such marital premia. Indeed, the wage gap can occur within
each productivity type. Nonetheless, di¤erences between the wages of mar-
ried and single men remains a possibility across types too, and in that case
these premia can be ranked in an empirically relevant manner. Furthermore,
this also shows that productivity heterogeneity is not a su¢ cient condition
either for a positive marriage premium: male reservation wage may very well
match the level required for successful marriage, in which case the marital
wage gap is zero.
Allowing for two-sided heterogeneity (where women also di¤er but this
time in terms of attractiveness in the marriage market), leads to further
insights in terms of the endogenous formation of marriage classes, which in
turn displays patterns of male marital premia that can again be tested using
data. More specically, by considering the reservation wage strategies of
men, we endogenise the range of characteristics (i.e. wages) on the male
side, which in turn leads to the emergence of marital classes. We construct
and establish the existence of a search equilibrium with class formation, fully
characterise it in terms of marriage wage patterns across classes, and show
that the bottom class will always contain men with zero marriage premium.
All these predictions o¤er a rich basis for an empirical test of the theo-
retical model. We carry out such an empirical investigation and the results
seem to support the search theoretical explanation of marriage premium. In
particular, we nd evidence that marriage premia follow the patterns across
productivity types suggested by our model, while men with very low socio-
economic characteristics exhibit zero marriage premium and are in partner-
ships with similarly below average women (pointing to the existence of a
bottom marital class).
It is also worth pointing out that our empirical analysis constitutes (as
far as we know) the rst attempt at nding evidence for the search theoretic
explanation of marriage premium. Given the simplicity of our model and
the strenght of its theoretical predictions, more empirical tests are needed.
We believe that further work (both theoretical and applied) that investigates
various outcomes in the context of inter-linked frictional markets represents
a very promising research project.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev
NCDS BHPS
log real weekly income 5.166 0.514
log real monthly income 6.827 0.489
married 0.739 0.439 0.591 0.492
education - degree 0.127 0.333 0.216 0.412
education - below degree 0.353 0.478 0.341 0.474
education - school leaver (16) 0.431 0.495 0.321 0.467
education - no qualications 0.089 0.284 0.122 0.327
age 34.511 8.558
excellent health 0.826 0.379 0.329 0.47
private sector 0.702 0.458 0.821 0.383
social class 1 (high) 0.071 0.257 0.081 0.273
social class 2 0.305 0.46 0.325 0.469
social class 3 non-manual 0.166 0.372 0.153 0.36
social class 3 manual 0.31 0.463 0.282 0.45
social class 4 0.113 0.316 0.13 0.336
social class 5 (low) 0.035 0.184 0.029 0.168
experience (days) 1714.625 2055.932
union 0.415 0.493
N 7380 19644
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Table 2: Summary statistics - Education, degree
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev
NCDS BHPS
log real weekly income 5.487 0.544
log real monthly income 7.106 0.524
married 0.748 0.434 0.545 0.498
age 34.485 8.176
excellent health 0.875 0.331 0.386 0.487
private 0.553 0.497 0.713 0.453
social class 1 (high) 0.232 0.422 0.24 0.427
social class 2 0.568 0.496 0.551 0.497
social class 3 non-manual 0.096 0.295 0.129 0.335
social class 3 manual 0.035 0.184 0.048 0.214
social class 4 0.045 0.207 0.031 0.172
social class 5 (low) 0.025 0.155 0.002 0.043
experience (days) 1188.782 1498.924
union 0.377 0.485
N 937 4251
Table 3: Summary statistics - Education, below degree
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev
NCDS BHPS
log real weekly income 5.267 0.506
log real monthly income 6.844 0.46
married 0.742 0.438 0.592 0.492
age 34.184 8.54
excellent health 0.848 0.359 0.345 0.476
private 0.690 0.462 0.809 0.393
social class 1 (high) 0.086 0.281 0.063 0.242
social class 2 0.38 0.485 0.368 0.482
social class 3 non-manual 0.172 0.377 0.19 0.392
social class 3 manual 0.274 0.446 0.281 0.45
social class 4 0.07 0.255 0.084 0.277
social class 5 (low) 0.018 0.134 0.014 0.118
experience (days) 1657.673 1960.923
union 0.438 0.496
N 2606 6701
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Table 4: Summary statistics - Education, school leaver (16)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev
NCDS BHPS
log real weekly income 5.056 0.444
log real monthly income 6.709 0.42
married 0.741 0.438 0.575 0.494
age 33.34 8.497
excellent health 0.808 0.394 0.297 0.457
private 0.735 0.441 0.875 0.33
social class 1 (high) 0.022 0.148 0.02 0.142
social class 2 0.208 0.406 0.212 0.409
social class 3 non-manual 0.199 0.399 0.163 0.37
social class 3 manual 0.399 0.49 0.378 0.485
social class 4 0.134 0.341 0.193 0.395
social class 5 (low) 0.037 0.189 0.033 0.178
experience (days) 1849.076 2123.723
union 0.416 0.493
N 3183 6297
Table 5: Summary statistics - Education, no qualications
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev
NCDS BHPS
log real weekly income 4.834 0.466
log real monthly income 6.591 0.435
married 0.702 0.458 0.714 0.452
age 38.55 8.252
excellent 0.755 0.43 0.265 0.441
private 0.797 0.403 0.906 0.292
social class 1 (high) 0.017 0.129 0.009 0.093
social class 2 0.099 0.299 0.103 0.304
social class 3 non-manual 0.086 0.28 0.066 0.248
social class 3 manual 0.414 0.493 0.446 0.497
social class 4 0.277 0.448 0.268 0.443
social class 5 (low) 0.107 0.309 0.109 0.311
experience (days) 2453.813 2641.215
union 0.419 0.493
N 654 2395
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Table 6: Marriage wage premium results
NCDS BHPS
 N  N
Full sample
Marriage wage premium 0.091*** 7380 0.074** 19644
(0.018) (0.046)
Education - degree
Marriage wage premium 0.022 937 -0.034 4251
(0.046) (0.074)
Education - below degree
Marriage wage premium 0.062** 2606 0.08* 6701
(0.029) (0.047)
Education - school leaver
Marriage wage premium 0.081*** 3183 0.165* 6297
(0.024) (0.091)
Education - no qualications
Marriage wage premium -0.011 654 0.042 2395
(0.069) (0.064)
*, **, *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% levels of signicance
All models include controls for region of residence, wave dummies, sector of employ-
ment, social class, health status and family size. BHPS models also include controls for
age, size of employer, experience and union status.
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Table 7: Partners Characteristics
NCDS BHPS
Partners years Partners Partner has Partner has Partners hourly Partners parental
of Education Social Class no qualications a degree income social class
Education -
degree 20.10*** 2.403*** 0.027*** 0.508*** 6.382*** 2.765***
(0.105) (0.034) (0.003) (0.011) (0.024) (0.029)
Education
below degree 18.31*** 2.886*** 0.111*** 0.145*** 6.031*** 3.542***
(0.086) (0.021) (0.005) (0.006) (0.018) (0.022)
Education -
school leaver 16.89*** 3.070*** 0.168*** 0.079*** 5.909*** 3.757***
(0.047) (0.019) (0.006) (0.005) (0.019) (0.021)
Education
- no qualications 16.35*** 3.349*** 0.377*** 0.037*** 5.824*** 4.078***
(0.113) (0.048) (0.012) (0.005) (0.025) (0.031)
N 5365 4646 10776 10776 8724 9602
*, **, *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% levels of signicance
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Appendix A: Ri (< T ) and bTi
For T 2 (bTi; wi], and given V Si (Ri) = Ji, the reservation wage solves:
Ri
r + 
=
0
r +  + 0
F (Ri)
RiZ
wi
Ri
r + 
dFi(w j w < Ri)+
+
0
r +  + 0
[Fi(T )  Fi(Ri)]
TZ
Ri
w
r + 
dFi(w j Ri < w < T )+
+
0
r +  + 0
[1  Fi(T )]
wiZ
T

w
r + 
+
n
(r + )(r +  + n)
y

dFi(w j w > T ):
After some manipulations, this simplies to:
Ri =
0
r + 
wiZ
Ri
[w  Ri] dFi(w) + 0[1  Fi(T )]n
(r + )(r +  + n)
y:
Further integration by parts leads to:
Ri =
0
r + 
Z wi
Ri
[1  Fi(w)] dw + [1  Fi(T )]n
r +  + n
y

(< T ).
The expression for bTi follows immediately:
bTi = 0
r + 
"Z wi
bTi [1  Fi(w)] +
[1  F (bTi)]n
r +  + n
y
#
(> Ri):
With no search frictions in the labour market (0 !1), clearly Ri(T ) =
wi. Note that bTi is a function of y. Since @Fi(bTi)=@ bTi > 0, it is true that
@ bTi=@y > 0. One can solve for y to get:
y =
(r +  + n)
h
(r + )bTi   0 R wibTi [1  Fi(w)] dwi
0n[1  Fi(bTi)] :
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Then, limbTi!wy =1 and, since bTi is an invertible function, limy!1bTi = wi.
Appendix B: Other equilibria
Assume bTH > wL. With @T@x > 0 and RH < bTL < wL < bTH ; it follows
that x < bxL < x < bxH .
Now assume bTH < wL. For x 2 [x; bxH ], there is always a unique equilib-
rium where only employed men can get married and both types do. The range
of possible equilibra and the necessary and su¢ cient conditions in terms of
x are as follows:
(a) An equilibrium with MPL > MPH > 0 obtains i¤ x > bxH :
(b) An equilibrium withMPL > 0 andMPH > 0 obtains i¤ x < x <bxH
(c) An equilibrium with MPL > 0 and MPH = 0 obtains i¤ bxL <
x < x
(d) An equilibrium with MPi = 0 (i = H;L) obtains i¤ x < x < bxL:
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 2 (numerical solution)
As all choice variables are continuous, it is enough to show that a two-class
equilibrium with the desirable properties exists for a given set of parameters.
Consider the following values for the relevant parameters of the model: 0 =
1:5;  = 0:1; r = 0:1;  = 1; p = 200; z = 200; u = 0:1; y = 0:4; y = 1. Given
a range of productivities [p; p] where each productivity has the same measure
u of unemployed, for men also we are dealing with an uniform distribution of
types. Finally, let the distribution of wages be uniform as well, with support
on [p; p+ z] for each type p.
With two classes (by construction), we have: n1 = [1 H(y1)] and n2 =
H(y1):Also, note that womens arrival rate is very sensitive to changes in u
and the productivity range.
Equilibrium:
We pick the equilibrium that is most di¢ cult to construct, i.e. the one
with p2 > p. Since p2 is endogenous, showing that such an equilibrium exists
is not trivial precisely because of this constraint on p.
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First, note that with the above inequality constraint, some of the indicator
functions in our value functions will be zero. Second, we need y2 < y. With
our numerical values, this inequality is indeed satised. Next, we compute
y1:
y1 = 0:615619
Now we can compute T1, given that p3  T1   z. We obtain:
T1 = 327:08844
This is clearly lower than the highest wage in the market, which is p+z =
400:
Next, we compute p2 and then show that it is indeed higher than p.
Making use of the equation for R(p) and equating it to T , we get bT (p).
Following that, solve bT (p) = T1 to obtain:
p2 = 258:944839 (> p)
Recall that p3 was dened by T1   z, so p3 = 127:08844. This allows us
to compute the value of being single for a Set 2 woman (W S2 ), as a function
of (any) p. We can then compare this with
R(p)
r+
(the value of being married
to a p man). Clearly, we need the latter to be greater than the former. The
explicit solution to W S2 is:
W S2 =
R p
p3
h
N 00p
R T1
R(p)
w
r+
dG0p(w)
i
dp+ u
R p
p
R(p)
r+
dp
r +  + u(p  p) + R p
p3
N 00p

G0p(T1) G0p(R(p))

dp
;
where G0p(T1) G0p(R(p)) = 1  0 = 1.
We nd that W S2 <
R(p)
r+
holds for p >  61:786371(= p). This means
that there is no lower (third) class if p >  61:786371. All men with p between
p and p3 constitute a subset of Set 2 - the subset of men with zero marriage
premium. These men are born in Set 2.
Overall, a non-empty set (p; p3), together with the condition on y ensure
the existence of our two-class equilibrium for a broad range of parameters.
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